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Abstract
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two
parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may
misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two
parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of
one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior
mean, no party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely
adversarial procedure with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial
procedure (Emons and Fluet 2009). We provide sufficient conditions
on when one procedure is better than the other one.
Keywords: evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adver-
sarial, inquisitorial.
JEL: D82, K41, K42
1 Introduction
How much testimony will an arbiter hear in adversarial proceedings when
the parties to the conflict may spend resources to misrepresent evidence in
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their favor? Will both parties come forward with boosted claims offsetting
each other, or will only the party for whom the evidence is favorable testify?
Are there circumstances where no party testifies? What are the efficiency
properties of the outcome? Is the adversarial procedure where the parties to
the conflict decide whether or not they testify better than the inquisitorial
procedure where the arbiter decides how much testimony he wants to hear?
In this paper we address these questions.
An arbiter has to decide on an issue which we take to be a real number,
for example, the damages that one party owes to the other. The defendant
wants the damages awarded to be small whereas the plaintiff wants them to
be large. Both parties know the actual amount owed to the plaintiff and both
would like to influence the arbiter’s decision. Presenting evidence, however,
involves a fixed cost. Moreover, the parties can boost the evidence in either
direction, but distorting the evidence involves additional costs: the greater
the distortion, the higher the cost. For instance, expert witnesses charge
more the more they distort the truth.
In a purely adversarial procedure the parties decide whether or not to
present testimony. The arbiter is passive at the discovery stage and only
intervenes at the adjudication stage. Once the parties have finished, he de-
cides the case on the basis of his priors about the amount at issue and of
what can be inferred from the parties’ actions. The arbiter seeks to min-
imize adjudication error, implying that his sequentially rational decision is
to adjudicate the posterior mean. When he hears no testimony, given the
symmetry of the parties’ actions, the posterior mean equals the prior, which
the arbiter therefore adjudicates. When he hears testimony, he updates his
beliefs upwards or downwards and adjudicates accordingly.
We first show that in equilibrium the parties never testify together: either
no or one party testifies. No party testifies when the true value is close to
the prior mean and thus influencing the arbiter has negligible private value:
it does not pay for the parties to incur the fixed cost of testifying. When,
however, the evidence is sufficiently in favor of one party, this party comes
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forward and testifies. If the plaintiff testifies, he overstates the true value;
if the defendant testifies, he understates the true value. Boasting increases
the more the true amount differs from the prior mean, yet at a decreasing
rate. Accordingly, for sufficiently large deviations from the prior mean, the
equilibrium is revealing, but it involves falsification on the part of the party
who testifies. The arbiter rationally corrects for the exaggerated amount and
adjudicates the true value. Stated differently, because the marginal cost of
slightly distorting the truth is negligible but the marginal return is not, the
arbiter expects some falsification, leading parties to do so systematically. At
equilibrium the arbiter expects both, error and falsification costs.
We measure welfare by summing the social loss from inaccurate adjudi-
cation and the parties’ submission costs. From a welfare point of view the
adversarial procedure has the following virtues: when the true value is close
to the prior mean, the parties remain silent and do not spend resources on
falsification, yet at the expense of incorrect decisions. Only when the true
value differs sufficiently from the prior mean do parties testify, thus enabling
correct decisions, yet at the expense of falsification.
In a second step we compare the equilibrium for the adversarial procedure
with our results for the purely inquisitorial procedure as derived in Emons
and Fluet (2009). Under the purely inquisitorial procedure the arbiter plays
first by deciding how much testimony he wants to hear. We assume that the
inquisitorial arbiter seeks to maximize welfare, taking into account submis-
sion costs and adjudication error. Specifically, he first announces whether
he wants to hear no, one, or both parties. The parties have to testify when
called upon by the arbiter and cannot testify unless they are asked to do so.
When the arbiter decides to hear no party, he rationally adjudicates the prior
mean; there is no falsification but error costs are positive. When he decides to
hear one party, depending on who testifies, the party over- resp. understates
the true value. The arbiter rationally corrects for the exaggerated amount
and adjudicates the true value. Accordingly, the equilibrium is revealing but
it involves falsification. When both parties submit, both testimonies involve
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falsification: one party over-reports while the other under-reports. The ar-
biter corrects for this by taking an average of the exaggerated testimonies.
Accordingly, under the inquisitorial procedure the arbiter incurs only error
costs (no testimony) or only falsification costs (single or joint testimony).
The optimal number of parties to submit evidence depends on the weight
given to inaccurate adjudication and the cost of obtaining evidence. If the
value of accuracy is above some threshold, the arbiter hears both parties
when the fixed cost of presenting evidence is small. For intermediate values
of the fixed cost, the arbiter goes for one party, and for large values he hears
no party at all.
Next we compare welfare under the two procedures. The inquisitorial
procedure fares better than the adversarial one when the arbiter cares little
or when he cares a lot about error costs. If error costs are of minor impor-
tance, under the inquisitorial procedure the arbiter goes for no testimony so
that there are no falsification but only error costs. Under the adversarial pro-
cedure there is some range where parties testify so that there are falsification
costs. When the arbiter cares a lot about error costs, he chooses single or
joint testimony under the inquisitorial procedure so that he incurs no error
costs. Under the adversarial procedure there is some range where the parties
do not testify so that there are error costs. Accordingly, when the arbiter
has strong views about error costs, the inquisitorial procedure does better
because it gives the arbiter full control over what kind of cost he incurs.
Next we derive conditions for the adversarial procedure to be better than
the inquisitorial one. If incorrect decisions do not matter too much and
the fixed cost of testifying is sufficiently large, the adversarial procedure is
better than the inquisitorial one. The reason for this is as follows: For the
inquisitorial procedure no testimony is optimal under these conditions. For
intermediate deviations from the prior mean, the parties do not testify under
the adversarial procedure, hence we have the same outcome as under the
inquisitorial procedure. Nevertheless, for large deviations the parties come
forward and testify. For these large deviations, the falsification cost is lower
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than the cost of incorrect decisions.
If the fixed submission cost is above some threshold, single testimony
is optimal under the inquisitorial procedure. When inaccurate decisions do
not matter too much, the adversarial procedure again does better than the
inquisitorial one. The reason is now that boasting is lower under adversarial
than under inquisitorial testimony required from a single party. Finally, when
the fixed cost of testifying is small, so is the range where parties do not testify
under the adversarial procedure. The loss from inaccurate decisions is then
lower than the submission costs under the inquisitorial procedure.
We thus have a simple framework allowing us to compare pure forms of the
adversarial and inquisitorial procedures. Under either procedure, parties may
dissipate resources in influence activities. Our approach is to treat boosted
claims as costly signals. For the purpose of comparison we, therefore, select
for each procedure the least-cost signalling equilibrium. In the adversarial
procedure, the parties can submit evidence as they see fit. In the inquisitorial
procedure, they can present evidence only if specifically required to do so.
In either case, at the adjudication stage, the arbiter chooses the sequentially
rational action given his beliefs. Under the adversarial procedure, his role is
solely to adjudicate once the parties have presented their claims. Under the
inquisitorial procedure, he plays an active role by first deciding whom he will
hear.
It is standard in the literature to view accuracy in adjudication and pro-
cedural economy as the objectives at which legal procedures should aim; see
for instance Sobel (1985), Froeb and Kobayashi (2001), and Parisi (2002).
Adversarial systems of discovery clearly motivate parties to provide evidence.
Nevertheless, they are often criticized (e.g., Tullock 1975, 1980) for yielding
excessive expenditures through unnecessary duplication and costly overpro-
duction of misleading information. We refer to legal procedures for concrete-
ness. The same issues arise in regulatory or administrative hearings as well
as in many other contexts.
One strand of literature has viewed the trial outcome as an exogenous
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function of the litigants’ levels of effort or expenditure by using so-called suc-
cess contest functions; see Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Farmer and Pecorino
(1999), Katz (1988), and Parisi (2002). In these papers adjudication is a zero-
one variable, i.e., a party either wins or loses. Parties engage in a rent-seeking
game, leading to excessive expenditures. Our approach differs in that the ar-
biter’s decisions are part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In our set-up
the arbiter is a sophisticated decision-maker who understands the parties’
incentives to boost their claims.
In another well-known strand of literature, trials are modeled as persua-
sion games. Parties cannot falsify the verifiable evidence as such, but are able
to misrepresent it by disclosing only what they see fit; see Sobel (1985), Mil-
grom and Roberts (1986), Lewis and Poitevin (1997), and Shin (1998). In our
framework, by contrast, the parties do not have access to hard information;
they dissipate resources in attempting to fabricate convincing stories.
Our paper is most closely related to the economics literature comparing
adversarial with inquisitorial procedures of truth-finding. In this literature,
“inquisitorial” usually refers to a system where a neutral investigator searches
for evidence, “adversarial” to one where the parties to the conflict control
the uncovering and presentation of evidence; see Shin (1998), Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999), Froeb and Kobayashi (2001), and Palumbo (2001). How-
ever, in civil litigation and by contrast with criminal trials, the presentation
of evidence essentially rests with the parties even in so-called inquisitorial
systems. The main difference is the judge’s involvement in controlling the
litigants’ presentation of evidence through bench requests, questions, and
the like; see Langbein (1985) or Parisi (2002) for a comparative description,
along these lines, of adversarial and inquisitorial systems. Demougin and
Fluet (2008) present an analysis of active versus passive judging in a persua-
sion game set-up. They show that a more active or inquisitorial arbiter may
eliminate inefficient equilibria. When presenting evidence involves a small
cost, multiple equilibria typically exist under a purely adversarial procedure
with a passive arbiter, some of which are more informative than others. Nev-
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ertheless, that paper does not deal with influence costs as such nor with the
trade-off between submission costs and accuracy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our
basic set-up. The following section derives the least-cost equilibrium. In the
subsequent section we compare the adversarial procedure with the inquisito-
rial one. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
A plaintiff A has sued a defendant B to obtain damages x ∈ R. Damages
are distributed with density f(x) with full support over the real line.1 We
assume f(x) to be unimodal and symmetric; the mean is given by µ and
the variance by σ2. At the beginning of the trial all parties involved, i.e.,
plaintiff, defendant, and arbiter, know the distribution of x. The mean µ is
such that, given the expected outcome of the trial, it is worthwhile for the
defendant to sue.2
After the plaintiff has filed suit, both, plaintiff and defendant, learn the
realization of x, meaning they become perfectly informed. The trial cannot
be stopped at this point; the adjudicator has to decide the case. In particular,
we rule out any out-of-court settlement negotiations.
The arbiter can adjudicate solely on the basis of his priors at that stage
of the procedure as given by f(x). Alternatively, he may receive further
evidence submitted from the perfectly informed but self-interested plaintiff
and defendant. The plaintiff A would like the adjudicated value of x to be
large while the defendant B would like it to be small.3
1We assume full support over the real line in order to avoid boundary conditions. The
probability of extreme values of x can be made, however, arbitrarily small.
2We will make this precise at the end of section 3.
3Throughout the text we take x to be damages. Yet other examples abound: For
example, in a divorce case x may be the amount of support A should get from B; in
regulatory hearings x may the rental charge for a local loop, the incumbent wants the
charge to be high whereas the entrant wants it to be low.
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After plaintiff and defendant have learned x, they may testify in court.
Testimony by the parties is costly. A submission is of the form “the value of
the quantity at issue is xi”, i = A,B. It should be thought of as a story or
argument rendering xi plausible, together with the supporting documents,
witnesses, etc. The cost of a presentation is γ + .5 (xi − x)2 , i = A,B,
where γ > 0. The actual value is x, which is observed by the party, and xi
is the testimony or the statement submitted.
A distorting presentation is more costly than simply reporting the naked
truth as it involves more fabrication. We take a quadratic function to cap-
ture the idea that the cost of misrepresenting the evidence increases at an
increasing rate the further one moves away from the truth: it becomes more
difficult to produce the corresponding documents or experts charge more the
more they distort the truth.4
After the plaintiff and defendant have observed x, they decide simultane-
ously whether they do not testify, denoted by ∅i, or whether they testify and
report xi, i = A,B. We denote their decision by si ∈ Si := {∅i∪R}, i = A,B.
The cost is
ci(si, x) =
{
γ + .5 (xi − x)2 , if si = xi;
0, if si = ∅i,
i = A,B. Total submission cost is C = cA + cB.
The arbiter observes the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s choices and then
adjudicates x̂(sA, sB). The arbiter is concerned about the loss from inaccu-
racy in adjudication and the parties’ submission costs. Accordingly, there
is a potential trade-off between procedural costs and the social benefits of
correct adjudication. From the arbiter’s perspective, the total social loss is
L = l + C
where l is the loss from inaccurate adjudication or “error costs” and C is
4Using quadratic falsification costs is standard in the literature. Maggi and Rodŕıguez-
Clare (1995) work with ci(xi, x) = γ + κ (xi − x)2 and interpret κ as capturing the pub-
licness of information. If κ = 0, falsification is costless, therefore, information is purely
private. As κ increases, it becomes more costly to falsify information and for an arbitrarily
large κ the public-information model obtains.
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total submission cost.
Let x̂ denote the arbiter’s decision. The loss from inaccurate adjudication
is
l(x̂, x) = θ(x̂− x)2
where θ > 0 is the rate at which the arbiter trades off accuracy against
submission costs. If the true value is adjudicated, error costs are zero. The
more the decision errs in either direction, the higher the losses from inaccurate
adjudication and such losses increase at an increasing rate the further one
moves away from the truth. The loss l should be interpreted as the societal
cost of incorrect decisions. For instance, in tort cases incorrect adjudication
may have an adverse effect on deterrence.
The set-up is as follows. The parties observe x and then simultaneously
pick sA and sB. The arbiter observes the parties’ choices and then adjudicates
x̂.
The parties choose sA and sB so as to maximize πA and πB where
πA(x̂, sA, x) = x̂− cA(sA, x) and
πB(x̂, sB, x) = − x̂− cB(sB, x).
If the arbiter hears testimony, he updates his beliefs which denotes the prob-
ability distribution over x in the information set given by the testimony. He
then adjudicates x̂ so as to minimize the loss from inaccurate adjudication.
To satisfy the arbiter’s concern about inaccurate decisions we look for equi-
libria where he infers the true x if he hears testimony. To satisfy the arbiter’s
concern about submission costs, we pick out of the set of revealing equilib-
ria the one where theses costs are minimal. We focus on symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibria.
3 The least-cost equilibrium
Suppose the plaintiff follows the strategy sA = ∅A for x < x0A and sA = xA(x)
otherwise; the defendant’s strategy is sB = ∅B for x > x0B and sB = xB(x)
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otherwise. Let xi be increasing and differentiable in x if i testifies alone or if
they testify together, i = A,B.5
We rule out totally unrevealing equilibria, meaning x0A and/or x
0
B are
bounded. There is thus some range where at least one party sends a signal
and x is revealed.6
Next, we need some structure on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We assume
that at an out-of-equilibrium information set the arbiter believes that it was
reached with the minimum number of deviations from the equilibrium strate-
gies. A similar restriction on beliefs, termed the minimality condition has
been used by Bagwell and Ramey (1991) or Emons and Fluet (2008, 2009).
First we show that the plaintiff and the defendant never testify together.
together. The formal derivation of the following results are relegated to the
Appendix.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium the plaintiff and the defendant never testify to-
gether, i.e., x0B < x
0
A.
To show this result we assume on the contrary that parties testify to-
gether. Yet it always pays for a party to deviate because this either changes
the adjudicated value in his favor or signalling costs fall by more than rev-
enues.
We can now state the least-cost signalling equilibrium. The equilibrium
has the following structure:
5No party will ever signal over the entire support. If he signals, he incurs at least a
cost of γ. He will not invest this amount to signal the arbiter that he is among the worst
possible types.
6Under a properness restriction on the arbiter’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs an equilib-
rium cannot be totally unrevealing (Myerson (1978)). To see this, suppose on the contrary
that the arbiter believes E(x) = µ for all si ∈ Si, i = A,B. If the parties actually choose
not to testify, the arbiter’s beliefs are borne out in equilibrium. Now suppose the arbiter
observes some xA  µ. Sending signal xA is a “big” mistake for the type µ plaintiff
and a “small” mistake for the type x = xA plaintiff at the proposed equilibrium. If the
arbiter believes that big mistakes are less likely than small ones, he should conclude upon
observing xA that the plaintiff is of type x = xA.
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(i) If x ∈ (µ − γ, µ + γ), neither party testifies; the arbiter believes and
adjudicates E(x | ∅A, ∅B) = x̂(∅A, ∅B) = µ, i.e., the prior mean.
(ii) If x ≥ µ+γ, the defendant plays ∅B and the plaintiff sends the signal
xA ≥ x solving
x = xA − 1 + e−(xA−µ−γ). (1)
The arbiter believes and adjudicates
E(x | xA, ∅B) = x̂(xA, ∅B) = xA − 1 + e−(xA−µ−γ) = x.
(iii) If x ≤ µ−γ, the plaintiff plays ∅A and the defendant sends the signal
xB ≤ x solving
x = xB + 1− e−(µ−γ−xB). (2)
The arbiter believes and adjudicates
E(x | ∅A, xB) = x̂(∅A, xB) = xB + 1− e−(µ−γ−xB) = x.
To sum up:
Proposition 1: In the least-cost equilibrium if x ≤ µ−γ, the defendant sends
the message xB solving (2) while the plaintiff is silent. If x ∈ (µ− γ, µ+ γ),
neither party testifies. If x ≥ µ+γ, the plaintiff sends the message xA solving
(1) and the defendant is silent. If one party testifies, the arbiter infers and
adjudicates the true x; if both parties do not testify, the arbiter rationally
expects and adjudicates µ.
Let us now look at the message xi, i = A,B in more detail. Solving (1)
and (2) yields
xA = x+ 1 + ProductLog(−e(µ+γ−x−1)) and
xB = x− 1 + ProductLog(−e−(µ−γ−x+1))
where the ProductLog is the inverse function of f(w) = wew.7 Consider, e.g.,
the plaintiff. We have xA(µ+γ) = µ+γ, i.e., at the threshold x
0
A = µ+γ the
7See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambert’s W function for more on the Pro-
ductLog.
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plaintiff signals the true x at zero variable cost. For x > x0A, xA(x) > x and
limx→∞ xA(x) = x+1. The plaintiff boasts damages; boasting increases with
damages, yet at a decreasing rate. See Figure 1. Except for the threshold,
if the plaintiff testifies, he falsifies. For xA > x
0
A, E(x | xA, ∅B) is strictly
monotone in xA: different x’s give rise to different xA’s, to which the arbiter
reacts by computing the correct expectation. Given ∂E(x | xA, ∅B)/∂xA 6= 0
and the marginal cost of lying is zero around the true value, it pays for the
plaintiff to falsify if he testifies.
x
( )Ax x
 
Figure 1: The least cost signalling strategies 
( )Bx x
( ) and x ( )A Bx x x
ix
B
A

 
 
 
1x
1x
The social loss as seen by the adjudicator is
LA =
∫ µ−γ
−∞
(γ + .5(x− xB)2)f(x)dx+ θ
∫ µ+γ
µ−γ
(x− µ)2f(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
µ+γ
(γ + .5(x− xA)2)f(x)dx
where the supersript A indicates the adversarial procedure. By symmetry,
the social loss can be rewritten as
LA = 2θ
∫ µ+γ
µ
(x− µ)2f(x) dx+ 2
∫ ∞
µ+γ
(γ + .5(x− xA)2)f(x)dx. (3)
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From a welfare point of view the adversarial procedure has the following
virtues: when the value of information is small, the parties remain silent
and do not spend resources on falsification, yet at the expense of incorrect
decisions. Only when the value of information is sufficiently large, parties
testify thus enabling correct decisions, yet at the expense of falsification.
Note that the loss is a linear function of the error cost weight θ with the
slope given by the error cost and the intercept given by the falsification cost.
Let us finally look at the plaintiff’s decision to sue. The plaintiff’s ex-
pected payoff in equilibrium is
E(πA) =
∫ µ−γ
−∞
xf(x)dx+ µ
∫ µ+γ
µ−γ
f(x)dx+∫ ∞
µ+γ
(x− γ − .5(x− xA)2)f(x)dx > µ− (γ + .5)
∫ ∞
µ+γ
f(x)dx
since (x−xA) < 1. The plaintiff sues if his expected payoff is positive. Thus,
µ > (γ + .5)
∫∞
µ+γ
f(x)dx is sufficient for the plaintiff to sue.
4 Comparing the adversarial with the inquisi-
torial procedure
Let us now compare our least-cost equilibrium under the adversarial proce-
dure with the least-cost equilibrium under the inquisitorial procedure which
we derive in Emons and Fluet (2009). Under the inquisitorial procedure the
judge decides how much testimony he wants to hear. More specifically, in the
first stage of the game we consider the arbiter announces whether he wants
to hear no, one, or both parties. We denote this decision by N,S, J where N
stands for no party being heard, S for only a single party being heard (this
would specify which one), and J for joint submissions.
Under procedure N , no party testifies and submission costs are, therefore,
zero. The arbiter then minimizes expected error costs solely on the basis of
the priors implying x̂ = µ. The expected total loss is LIN = θσ
2 where the
superscript I indicates the inquisitorial procedure. Obviously, θσ2 is also
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the value of perfect information, given the accuracy σ2 of the arbiter’s prior
information.
If only party A is heard, xA(x) = x+ 1 and x̂(xA) = xA− 1; if only party
B is heard xB(x) = x − 1 and x̂(xB) = xB + 1. The equilibrium is fully
revealing and error costs are, therefore, zero. The expected loss LIS = γ + .5.
If both parties are required to testify xA(x) = x+ .5, xB(x) = x− .5, and
x̂(xA, xB) = .5xA + .5xB. The equilibrium is fully revealing and error costs
are again zero. The expected loss LIJ = 2γ + .25.
Here the interesting result is that the extent of lying by, say, B under
single submission is twice the amount of his lying under joint submission.
The reason is that under single submission greater weight is given to the
party’s report, thereby inducing him to falsify more. Thus, confronting the
parties in hearings induces either of them to distort the evidence less than
when only one testimony is heard. Given the quadratic cost of lying, this
implies that the total variable cost of distorting is less under joint than under
single submissions. Yet when both parties are heard, we have a duplication
of the fixed submission cost γ.
Accordingly, under the inquisitorial procedure the arbiter has full control
over which kind of costs he incurs: either only error costs (no testimony)
or only falsification costs (single or joint testimony). The arbiter chooses
whether no, only one party, or both parties are required to submit evidence
so as to minimize the expected loss. For γ ≤ .25, the optimal procedure is J
if θσ2 ≥ 2γ + .25 and N otherwise; for γ > .25, the optimal procedure is S if
θσ2 ≥ γ + .5 and N otherwise. Figure 2 shows in the (θ, γ) plane the regions
where the arbiter requires both, only one, or no party to submit evidence; in
the figure we have set σ2 = 1.
When the value of information is large (i.e., θ > .75), the arbiter requires
joint submissions if the fixed submission cost is sufficiently small, single sub-
missions for intermediate values, and hears no one if the fixed cost is large.
When .25 < θ < .75, the relevant choice is only between joint submissions or
hearing no one: the value of information is then not large enough for single
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submissions to be worth it since they entail too much falsification. Finally,
when θ < .25, the value of information is too small even to compensate for
the falsification costs under joint submissions.
Having described the outcome under the inquisitorial procedure, we now
give sufficient conditions for one procedure to be better than the other one.
Proposition 2:
a) When θ is small or when θ is large, the expected loss under the inquisi-
torial procedure is lower than under the adversarial procedure.
b) Let g(θ) := (1 +
√
2θ + 1)/2θ. If γ ≥ g(θ) and γ ≥ θ − .5 or if
γ ≥ .25, γ ≤ θ − .5, and γ ≤ g(θ), the expected loss under the adversarial
procedure is lower than under the inquisitorial procedure.
The proof for the superiority of the inquisitorial procedure is straight-
forward. When θ is small, no testimony is optimal under the inquisitorial
procedure, leading to a social loss of θσ2; see Figure 2. Obviously, the less
the arbiter cares about accuracy, the smaller this loss becomes. The loss
under the adversarial procedure as given by (3), is linear in θ. Hence, even
if θ = 0, society incurs the falsification costs with adversarial testimony.
If θ is sufficiently large, single or joint testimony is optimal under the
inquisitorial procedure, leading to a loss of γ + .5 or 2γ + .25; see Figure
2. The equilibria are fully revealing and error costs are, therefore, zero.
Under the adversarial procedure the parties do not testify over the interval
(µ − γ, µ + γ) leading to error costs that increase linearly with θ. We may
thus conclude: Under the inquisitorial procedure we have no falsification
costs under no testimony and no error costs under single or joint testimony.
Under adversarial testimony both falsification and error costs occur with
positive probability. Thus, when the arbiter cares very little or very much
about error costs, he does better with the inquisitorial procedure where he
fully controls which kind of costs he incurs.
Let us now look at the cases where the adversarial procedure does better
than the inquisitorial one. First we compare adversarial with no testimony. If
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γ ≥ g(θ), LA < LIN . Over the interval (µ−γ, µ+γ) our adversarial least-cost
equilibrium and N yield the same outcome — namely no testimony. In the
tails x ≤ µ−γ and x ≥ µ+γ, the adversarial procedure leads to the submis-
sion costs γ+.5(x−xi)2 < γ+.5 since |x−xi| < 1; the inquisitorial procedure
leads to the loss of inaccurate decisions θ(x − µ)2 > θγ2. If γ ≥ g(θ), sub-
mission costs are lower than the loss from inaccurate decisions. Submission
costs increase linearly while error costs increase with the square of γ. Thus,
for γ sufficiently large, adversarial testimony is better than no testimony. In
region N , no testimony is optimal under the inquisitorial procedure. Thus,
when we are in region N and γ ≥ g(θ), the adversarial procedure is better
than the inquisitorial one.


3 4 121.5
1
1 4
1 4
Figure 2: Optimal amount of testimony under the inquisitorial procedure
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Next let us compare the adversarial outcome with single submission S.
Here we have that if γ ≤ g(θ), LA < LIS. Over the interval (µ− γ, µ+ γ) the
adversarial procedure leads to the loss from inaccurate decisions θ(x−µ)2 <
θγ2; in the tails the loss from boasting is γ+.5(x−xi)2 < γ+.5. The loss from
single testimony is γ + .5. For γ sufficiently small, the loss from inaccurate
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decisions is smaller than the submission cost for x ∈ (µ−γ, µ+γ). In region
S, single testimony is optimal under the inquisitorial procedure. Thus, when
we are in region S and γ ≤ g(θ), the adversarial procedure is better than the
inquisitorial one.
Last consider joint submissions J . Under joint submissions for large val-
ues of |x| the variable cost of falsifying of .25 is lower than the variable
cost under the adversarial procedure. Yet, the fixed cost is duplicated. For
x ∈ [µ− γ, µ + γ] the error cost under the adversarial procedure have to be
compared with the submission cost of 2γ+ .25 of the inquisitorial procedure.
A general comparison of joint submissions with the adversarial procedure
turns out to be impossible.
We can, nevertheless, make the following argument. For θ ≥ .75 along
the line γ = .25 single and joint testimony lead to the same expected loss
which is, moreover, continuous in γ for both procedures. From Proposition
2 we know that along this line for θ ∈ [.75, 12] the adversarial procedure
leads to losses strictly lower than single testimony. Therefore, by continuity,
adversarial testimony also leads to lower losses than joint testimony for γ =
.75− ε, θ ∈ [.75, 12], ε sufficiently small.8
Note that we have derived only sufficient conditions for one procedure to
be better than the other one. Hence, for the areas other than the ones we
have identified, we don’t know which of the procedures is better.
To sum up: If the arbiter has strong views about submission costs, the
inquisitorial procedure is better than the adversarial one, because the arbiter
has full control about which kind of cost he incurs. If the arbiter is concerned
about both, submission and falsification costs, the adversarial procedure may
be better than the inquisitorial one because parties testify when the private
and social value of information is high and do not testify when it is low.
8This type of argument can also be made for region N (S) facing the area S (N) where
the adversarial procedure is better than the inquisitorial one.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We have derived the equilibrium testifying behavior under adversarial ar-
bitration. When the true value of the amount at issue differs only slightly
from the prior mean, the parties remain silent and do not spend resources
on falsification. This comes at the expense of incorrect decisions, but the
social loss from inaccurate adjudication will then also be small. Only when
the true value differs sufficiently from the prior mean do parties testify. This
enables correct decisions, yet at the expense of falsification costs.
Moreover, we have compared the adversarial with the inquisitorial pro-
cedure, taking into account submission costs and accuracy in adjudication.
The inquisitorial procedure performs better when the arbiter has strong views
about error costs; the adversarial procedure may perform better when the
arbiter cares about both, error and falsification costs.
We have assumed extreme forms both for the adversarial and inquisitorial
procedures. Under the former, our arbiter is passive and can just wait for
testimony by the parties. Under the latter, the arbiter does not have the
option to let the parties freely decide whether they want to testify: he can
only either summon them to testify or refuse to hear them. Obviously, an
active arbiter who also has the option to let the parties freely testify would
yield the best of both worlds. On matters where accuracy has negligible social
value, he would refuse to hear the parties. When accuracy has very large
social value, he could summon one or both parties to testify. In intermediate
cases, he could let the parties decide whether or not they want to testify.
He then relies on the parties’ superior private information about the true
state to reach the best compromise between submission costs and accuracy.
This is not unlike the justification often given for “managerial judges” who
participate in activities such as pretrial discovery and settlement bargaining
(see Schrag, 1999).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose on the contrary that there is some range [x0A, x
0
B] where
both parties testify and the equilibrium is revealing. At, say, x0B the plaintiff A
reports xA(x0B), the defendant B signals xB(x
0
B), and E(x|xA(x0B), xB(x0B)) = x0B.
See Figure 6.
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We have to distinguish three cases.
i) Let xA(x0B) ≤ limε→0 xA(x0B + ε). Here there is no signal xi which is sent by
party i for different two different values of x. The argument depends on whether
the plaintiff’s signalling costs go up or down when he switches from xA(x0B) to
xA(x0B + ε) given x = x
0
B. For ε sufficiently small, the sign of the cost change is
the same if x = x0B + ε.
Consider first the case where the plaintiff’s cost does not increase when he
switches from xA(x0B + ε) to xA(x
0
B). Let the true state be x
0
B + ε. Along the
equilibrium path (xA(x0B + ε), ∅B) and the arbiter correctly infers x0B + ε.
If the plaintiff deviates to xA(x0B), the arbiter observes (xA(x
0
B), ∅B) which
is off the equilibrium. By the minimality condition the judge thinks that either
the defendant deviated while the plaintiff played his equilibrium action and the
underlying x = x0B; or he thinks that the defendant played his equilibrium action
∅B while the plaintiff deviated and the underlying x =
∫∞
x0B
xf(x)dx/
∫∞
x0B
f(x)dx >
x0B + ε for ε small. The arbiter assigns equal probability to both possibilities so
that E(x|xA(x0B), ∅B) > x0B + ε. Since the plaintiff’s cost does not increase and
his revenue increases, he will deviate.
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Now consider the case where the plaintiff’s costs decrease when he switches
from xA(x0B) to xA(x
0
B + ε). Let the true state be x
0
B. Along the equilibrium path
(xA(x0B), xB(x
0
B)) and the arbiter correctly infers x
0
B.
Suppose the plaintiff switches to xA(x0B + ε) so that the arbiter observes
(xA(x0B + ε), xB(x
0
B)) which is off the equilibrium. Then the judge thinks that
the plaintiff deviated and x = x0B or the defendant deviated and x = x
0
B+ε. Thus,
E(x|xA(x0B + ε, xB(x0B)) = x0B + .5ε. The plaintiff’s costs decrease, his revenue
does not decrease, hence he will deviate.
ii) Let xA(x0B) > limε→0 xA(x
0
B + ε) and limx→∞ xA(x) ≥ xA(x0B). Here there
are signals xi which are sent by party i for two different values of x.
Consider first the case where xA(x0A) < xA(x
0
B+ε) or, by symmetry, xB(x
0
B) >
xB(x0A − ε) which is given by the dotted line in Figure 6. Here xB(x0B) is played
by B only at x0B in equilibrium. Let x
′ > x0B be such that xA(x
′) = xA(x0B). Now
suppose A lowers the signal to xA(x0B) − ε so that the judge observes (xA(x0B) −
ε, xB(x0B)) which is off the equilibrium path. Then he thinks with equal probability
that either A deviated and x = x0B or B deviated and x = x
0
B− ε or x = x′− δ; let
the arbiter assign probabilities b > 0 and (1 − b) to the two possibilities. Hence,
E(x|xA(x0B)− ε, xB(x0B)) = .5x0B + .5(b(x0B − ε) + (1− b)(x′ − δ)). For ε going to
zero, so does δ and limε→0E(x|xA(x0B)− ε, xB(x0B)) > x0B. A’s revenue increases,
hence he will deviate.
Now consider the case where xA(x0A) > xA(x
0
B +ε) or, by symmetry, xB(x
0
B) <
xB(x0A − ε). Here any equilibrium signal xi under joint testifying is also played
when i testifies alone. Let x′′ < x0A be such that xB(x
′′) = xB(x0B).
Suppose the true state is x0B. Along the equilibrium path (xA(x
0
B), xB(x
0
B))
and the judge infers x0B. If A lowers his signal to xA(x
0
B) − ε, the judge observes
(xA(x0B) − ε, xB(x0B)) which is off the equilibrium. Then the arbiter thinks with
probability .5 that A deviated and x = x0B or x = x
′′; the judge assigns probabilities
b and (1− b) to theses possibilities. With probability .5 he thinks that B deviated
and x = x0B − ε or x = x′ − δ. Thus, E(x|xA(x0B) − ε, xB(x0B)) = .5(bx0B + (1 −
b)x′′) + .5(b(x0B − ε) + (1− b)(x′ − δ). We have limε→0E(x|xA(x0B)− ε, xB(x0B)) =
bx0B + .5(1− b)(x′ + x′′). If this exceeds x0B, A deviates.
If B lowers his signal to xB(x0B) − ε, the judge observes (xA(x0B), xB(x0B) −
ε) which is off the equilibrium. Then he thinks that B deviated and x = x0B
or x = x′; or he thinks A deviated and x = x0B − ε or x = x′′ − δ. Hence,
E(x|xA(x0B), xB(x0B) − ε) = .5(bx0B + (1 − b)x′) + .5(b(x0B − ε) + (1 − b)(x′′ − δ)).
Again we have limε→0E(x|xA(x0B), xB(x0B)− ε) = bx0B + .5(1− b)(x′ + x′′). If this
is less than x0B, B will deviate.
iii) Let xA(x0B) > limε→0 xA(x
0
B + ε) and limx→∞ xA(x) < xA(x
0
B). Here again
there is no signal xi which is sent by party i for two different values of x and the
argument is along the same lines as in i). 
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Proof of Proposition 1. The equilibrium strategies satisfy the following conditions:
(i) There exists x0A > x
0
B such that A plays sA = ∅A if x < x0A and sA = xA
otherwise, for some xA yet to be determined; B plays sB = ∅B if x > x0B and
sB = xB otherwise, for some xB yet to be determined.
(ii) The adjudicator’s beliefs are denoted ϕ(sA, sB). Along the equilibrium
path these beliefs are the updated expectation of x given the parties’ actions,
i.e., ϕ(sA, sB) = E (x | sA, sB). The adjudicator’s seeks to minimize the expected
quadratic error. Hence, his sequentially rational strategy is x̂ = ϕ(sA, sB).
Priors are represented by the density f(x) which is unimodal and symmetric
with mean µ and variance by σ2. We focus on equilibria where when one party
submits and the true x is inferred by the adjudicator.
Consider first the case x ≥ x0A. Then only A signals and the equilibrium
strategies satisfy
∂πA(ϕ(xA, ∅B), xA, x)/∂xA = ∂ϕ(xA, ∅B)/∂xA − (xA − x) = 0
and ϕ(xA, ∅B) = x for all x ≥ x0A.
Combining both conditions yields the differential equation
∂ϕ(xA, ∅B)/∂xA − (xA − ϕ(xA, ∅B)) = 0 for all x ≥ x0A. (4)
The strategy xA is then a global maximum for party A; see Mailath (1987). The
general solution for the differential equation (4) is
ϕ(xA, ∅B) = Ke−xA + xA − 1. (5)
Signalling costs (excluding the fixed cost) are
.5 (xA − ϕ(xA, ∅B))2 = .5
(
1−Ke−xA
)2
.
The “smallest” message sent by A occurs when x = x0A. Signalling costs in
that state of the world are minimized if xA(x0A) = x
0
A. This requires K = e
x0A .
Substituting in (5) and recalling that ϕ(xA(x), ∅B)) ≡ x then yields
x = xA − 1 + e− (xA−x
0
A) for all x ≥ x0A. (6)
The solution xA to this equation is party A’s signalling strategy. The constant x0A
remains to be determined.
Consider next the case where x ≤ x0B. Now only B submits. The argument is
similar to the one above, except that B wants to persuade the adjudicator that x
is small. We obtain:
x = xB + 1− e−(x
0
B−xB) for all x ≤ x0B. (7)
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The solution xB to this equation is party B’s signalling strategy.
It remains to determine the constants x0A and x
0
B. When neither party submits,
the arbiter’s beliefs are
ϕ∅ := E (x | ∅A, ∅B) = E
(
x | x0B < x < x0A
)
. (8)
At x = x0A party A is just indifferent between submitting and not submitting. If
the party submits, the true state is revealed at the cost of γ. If the party does not
submit, the arbiter adjudicates ϕ∅. Thus party A is indifferent if x0A − γ = ϕ∅.
Using the same argument, when x = x0B, party B is indifferent between submitting
and not if −x0B − γ = −ϕ∅. Combining with (8) yields
ϕ∅ = E (x | ϕ∅ − γ < x < ϕ∅ + γ) .
Thus, the updated expectation given that x is in the interval [ϕ∅− γ, ϕ∅+ γ] must
be the mid point ϕ∅. With a symmetric unimodal prior density this is possible
only if ϕ∅ equals the prior mean µ.
Consequently, x0A = µ+ γ, x
0
B = µ− γ. The equilibrium signalling strategies,
therefore, satisfy
x = xA − 1 + e− (xA−µ−γ) for all x ≥ µ+ γ and
x = xB + 1− e− (µ−γ−xB) for all x ≤ µ− γ. 
Proof of Proposition 2 b).
For the loss under the adversarial procedure as given by (3) we have
LA < 2θ
∫ µ+γ
µ
(x− µ)2f(x) dx+ 2(γ + .5)
∫ ∞
µ+γ
f(x)dx (9)
since x− xA < 1.
For the loss under no testimony we have
LIN ≥ 2θ
∫ µ+γ
µ
(x− µ)2f(x)dx+ 2θγ2
∫ ∞
µ+γ
f(x)dx
because (x− µ)2 > γ2 for x ≥ µ+ γ. Therefore, if γ > g(θ), LA < LIN .
Using (9), since (x− µ)2 ≤ γ2 for ∈ [µ, µ+ γ], we have
LA < 2θγ2
∫ µ+γ
µ
f(x)dx+ 2(γ + .5)
∫ ∞
µ+γ
f(x)dx.
Hence, if γ < g(θ), LA < LIS = γ + .5. 
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